




























dAccounting Forum 35 (2011) 262– 274
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Accounting  Forum
jou rna l h om epa ge: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /acc for
he  accounting  treatment  of  intangibles  –  A  critical  review  of  the
iterature
aniel  Zéghal ∗, Anis  Maaloul
GA-Accounting Research Centre, Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa, 55 Laurier E. (7104), Ottawa, ON, K1N 6N5 Canada
 r  t  i  c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 19 April 2010
eceived in revised form 29 March 2011








a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Intangible  investments  have  become  the  main  value  creators  for  many  companies  and
economic  sectors.  However,  these  investments  are  rarely  recognized  as  assets  by  current
accounting  standards.  We  provide  a critical  review  of  the  literature  on  the  consequences  of
this  lack  of  accounting  recognition  of  intangibles  for the  value-relevance  of  ﬁnancial  infor-
mation, resource  allocation  in  the  capital  market,  growth  of intangible  investments,  and  the
ﬁrm’s  market  value.  We  then  review  recent  empirical  research  on  voluntary  disclosure  of
information  on intangibles.  Our  survey  concludes  that  disclosure  can  considered  as  a  solu-
tion  to  the  negative  consequences  of  non-recognition  of intangibles  in  ﬁnancial  statements.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
. Introduction
The nature of investment made by companies has drastically changed during the last two  decades: in addition to the
nvestment in tangible capital, several investments in “intangible capital” have become increasingly important.
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2007), investments in intangible
apital are competing with investment in tangible capital in some countries. For example, in 2002, the total expenditure in
ntangible capital was larger than the investment in tangible capital in the United States and Finland.
At a micro-economic level, several authors, such as Stewart (1997) and Zéghal (2000),  reveal that intangible assets are
aking an increasingly important place in a company’s capital and are, in fact, becoming more important than tangible assets.
This change in investment structure expresses, according to several economists, the transition of the industrial econ-
my towards a new “knowledge-based” economy. Indeed, several economic institutions, such as the OECD (2007) and UK
epartment of Trade and Industry (2004),  consider intangible assets as the main source of value creation in the new economy.
However, the valuation of intangible assets within the accounting framework raises several problems relating to their
dentiﬁcation, measurement, and control. These problems imply that the traditional accounting model, which is based on
angible assets, historical costs, and accounting conservatism, is incapable of fully evaluating the new-economy companies
Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Liang & Yao, 2005; Upton, 2001).
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Indeed, under current accounting standards,1 most intangible investments2 are to be expensed when incurred. The
relative lack of accounting recognition of intangible investments as assets led several researchers in accounting and ﬁnance to
wonder about the consequences of this inadequate accounting treatment on (1) the value-relevance of ﬁnancial information,
(2) the allocation of resources in the capital market, (3) the growth of intangible investments, and (4) the market value of
the ﬁrm.
The main objective of our paper is therefore to provide a critical review of these previous studies. We  then examine
recent empirical studies on voluntary disclosure of information on intangibles versus traditional accounting reports. Our
survey concludes that disclosure is considered as a solution to mitigate the negative consequences of non-recognition of
intangibles in the ﬁnancial statements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: Section 2 brieﬂy presents the notion of “intangibles” and its different
categories. The accounting treatment of intangibles is presented in Section 3 according to both international and American
accounting standards. The accounting and socio-economic consequences are detailed in Section 4. Section 5 then illustrates
the role of disclosure as a solution to palliate these different consequences. The last section is devoted to the conclusion.
2. Notions and categories of intangibles
The term “intangible” covers various complementary notions which are no different in form and substance such as
intangible investments, intangible assets and intangible capital. Moreover, the literature review across disciplines highlights
several other concepts that can be considered synonymous with the term “intangible capital” namely “intellectual capital”,
“immaterial capital”, “knowledge capital” and even “goodwill.”
Hunter, Webster, and Wyatt (2005) go further and specify the difference between intellectual capital and intangible
capital. Thus, they suggest, according to economic literature, that intellectual capital is viewed as a subset of intangible
capital where the term “intangible” relates to assets without a physical substance and “capital” refers to assets retained by
the organization to contribute to future proﬁts.
This speciﬁcation is, in fact, consistent with the one made earlier by Blair and Wallman (2000) – directors of the Brooking’s
Institution research project on intangible assets, who distinguished between three major categories of intangibles:
(1) Intangibles for which property rights are relatively clear and for which markets exist (generally can be bought and sold).
Within this category, two types of intangibles can be distinguished:
- Assets such as patents, copyrights and trade names.
- Business agreements, licenses, enforceable contracts, and data bases
(2) Intangibles that are controlled by the ﬁrm but for which well-deﬁned and legally-protected property rights may  not exist,
and markets are weak or nonexistent. Examples are R&D in process, business secrets, reputational capital, proprietary
management systems, and business processes.
(3) Intangibles for which the ﬁrm has few, if any, control rights and markets do not exist, and which are tied to the people
who work for the ﬁrm. Examples are human assets, structural (or organizational) assets, and relational assets, i.e. the
components of intellectual capital.3
According to Ashton (2005),  the guiding principle for Blair and Wallman’s (2000) classiﬁcation scheme is related to the
degree of difﬁculty of establishing ownership or control rights and more generally the difﬁculty of measurement. In this
sense, the third category of intangibles raises more accounting problems than the second category and far more than the
ﬁrst category.
Other classiﬁcations, mainly developed by accounting standard-setters, were limited to two categories of intangible
assets: internally generated intangibles and externally acquired ones. In this setting, externally acquired intangibles do not
generally raise accounting problems as the price of these assets has been generally determined during the transaction in
monetary form. Inversely, serious accounting problems could arise when the asset is internally generated by the company.
1 The accounting treatment of intangibles is analyzed in this paper through the International (IAS/IFRS) and American (SFAC/SFAS) accounting standards.
2 This term particularly refers to internally generated intangible investments. A more comprehensive discussion on the accounting treatment of intan-
gibles will be presented in Section 3.
3 According to the literature, intellectual capital is classiﬁed into 3 categories: human assets, structural assets, and relational assets. Human asset refers
to  the knowledge, qualiﬁcations, skills and know-how of employees. Structural asset constitutes the supportive infrastructure that enables human asset
to  function in an organization. It comprises procedures, practices, computer and administrative systems of the company. Relational assets concern the
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. Accounting treatment of intangibles
.1. Restrictive accounting rules
An intangible investment appears in the company’s balance-sheet if it meets at the same time the deﬁnition of an
ntangible asset and the accounting recognition criteria. However, the accounting standards impose, for the accounting of
ntangibles, conditions that are so restrictive that only few investments can appear in the assets of organizations (Bessieux-
llier, Lacroix, & Walliser, 2006; Siegel & Borgia, 2007).
An intangible asset is deﬁned by the IASB (2004) as “an identiﬁable4 non-monetary asset without physical substance”
p.2). In the same way, the FASB NN (2001a) deﬁned an intangible asset a “non current, nonﬁnancial claims to future beneﬁts
hat lacks a physical or ﬁnancial term” (p.6). These deﬁnitions must, nevertheless, be interpreted jointly with the general
eﬁnition of an “asset.” According to IASB’s Framework (§49), the asset is deﬁned as “a resource controlled by the enterprise
s a result of past events and from which future economic beneﬁts are expected to ﬂow to the enterprise.” This deﬁnition is
ery similar to the one provided by the FASB (SFAC 6, §25).
Following this general deﬁnition of an asset, the notion of “control” is going to raise an accounting problem with intan-
ibles. The IASB (IAS 38, §13) and FASB (SFAC 6, §26) explained the control of an asset in the same way. According to these
wo Boards, an enterprise controls an asset if the enterprise has the power to obtain the future economic beneﬁts ﬂowing
rom the underlying resource and also can restrict the access of others to those beneﬁts.
In this context, in the case of intangibles, some questions arise such as the protection of employees’ skills and knowledge.
ev (2001) underlines that companies do not own their employees nor the ideas which they have in their heads. He discusses
he control problem under the title of “Partial Excludability.” For example, when a ﬁrm invests in training its employees,
ther ﬁrms will beneﬁt from such investments if the trained employees switch employers. As a result, these intangible
nvestments could not be capitalized because of the lack of certainty relating to the contractual relation between the ﬁrm
nd its employees.
Upton (2001) also underlines that an enterprise may  possess items that meet the deﬁnition of assets, but will still not
ecognize those items in ﬁnancial statements. Indeed, an important recognition criterion required by accounting standards
IASB, IAS 38 §21; FASB, SFAC 5 §63), namely “the reliability of measurement of asset cost,” raises another accounting
roblem with intangibles. Although this criterion could be easily satisﬁed if the asset is separately acquired5 or within a
usiness combination,6 it presents great difﬁculty in the case of internally generated assets such as software, trademarks,
atents, and the like, i.e. the results of research and development activity.
For example, according to FASB rules, research and development (R&D) expenditures must be expensed when incurred
SFAS 2), except for the development costs of computer software that can be capitalized (SFAS 86). However, the capitalization
f these costs is conditional on the successful achievement of technological feasibility tests. In this sense, the costs incurred
o establish the technological feasibility of a product are considered R&D under SFAS 2 and expensed as incurred. Inversely,
he costs incurred after establishing technological feasibility and before the product is available for general release are
apitalized.
According to the FASB’s conclusion in SFAS 2, many reasons can explain the decision for immediate expensing of R&D costs.
hese reasons are related to uncertainty of future beneﬁts, inability to measure future beneﬁts, lack of a causal relationship
etween costs and beneﬁts, and lack of usefulness to investors.
According to IASB rules, the accounting treatment of internally generated intangible assets is less rigid but it remains
eﬁcient. Indeed, IAS 38 details necessary stages for the creation of an intangible asset by specifying at every stage whether it
s possible to predict future economic beneﬁts associated with the asset. It thus distinguishes a research phase during which
ll research costs must be immediately expensed when incurred. The development phase allows an entity to bring proof of
xistence of an intangible asset’s capacity to generate revenue. In this setting, the development costs must be capitalized
rovided such costs comply with certain conditions.7
The cases where expenses related to the creation of intangible assets could appear in the balance sheet are, however,
carce. IAS 38 (§64) speciﬁes, in fact, that “any expenditure that cannot be distinguished from the cost of developing the
usiness as a whole is not recognized as an intangible asset”. This is generally the case for internally generated brands,
ustomer lists, and items similar in substance that cannot be recognized as intangible assets.4 By identiﬁable, the IASB (IAS 38) expresses the fact that they can differentiate assets from goodwill.
5 According to the IAS 38 and SFAS 142, the cost can be reliably measured, in this case, because the acquisition price was generally determined during
he  transaction and appears under monetary form or other monetary assets.
6 According to the IFRS 3 and SFAS 141, the asset cost is the asset’s fair value at the time of business combination. The fair value can be reliably measured
f  there is a market price provided in reference to an active market.
7 These conditions are: (a) the technical feasibility of completing the intangible asset so that it will be available for use or sale; (b) its intention to complete
he  intangible asset and use or sell it; (c) its ability to use or sell the intangible asset; (d) how the intangible asset will generate probable future economic
eneﬁts; (e) the availability of adequate technical, ﬁnancial and other resources to complete the development and to use or sell the intangible asset; and
f)  its ability to measure reliably the expenditure attributable to the intangible asset during its development (IASB, IAS 38, §57).
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3.2. The utopia of ‘accounting conservatism’
The conservatism principle is a signiﬁcant principle of valuation in accounting. It often justiﬁes the immediate expensing
of intangible investments (AAA, 2003; Billiot & Glandon, 2005; Lev, Sarath, & Sougiannis, 2005; Lev, 2003).
Deﬁned by Basu (1997, p. 7),  accounting conservatism is “the accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of veriﬁ-
cation to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses.” This practice therefore results in asymmetric
treatment of gains and losses and persistent understatement of earnings and book value in the balance sheet.
However, Lev et al. (2005) show that no accounting practice consistently applied can be conservative throughout the
company’s life. In other words, if the company begins to be ‘conservative’ during some periods, it would later become
‘aggressive’ by inﬂating the earnings. In this sense, companies with high R&D growth rates relative to their proﬁtability8 (often
emerging industries, such as biotechnology, and young companies) report conservatively when they expense intangibles.
Inversely, companies with low R&D growth rates (mature companies) report aggressively.
Monahan (2005) conﬁrmed this ﬁnding by showing that conservative accounting treatment affects the earnings-return
relation only for companies that experience high growth in R&D. The often “negative” relationship between earnings and
return for several new-economy companies implies, according to Darrough and Ye (2007),  that a large loss will tend to
reverse to a large proﬁt at some point in the future. Consequently, recent studies show that the widely held view that the
expensing of intangible investments generally leads to conservative earnings reporting is a misconception. But, what matters
is that either conservatism or aggressiveness generally leads to a failure to match costs with revenue.
4. Accounting and socio-economic consequences
4.1. Does the inadequate accounting treatment of internally generated intangibles affect the value-relevance of ﬁnancial
information?
Most intangible investments are immediately expensed when incurred, while the beneﬁts resulting from these invest-
ments are recorded later (Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Lev, 2003; Siegel & Borgia, 2007). As a result, the accounting principle of
periodically matching costs with revenues is seriously distorted, potentially adversely affecting the value-relevance9 of
ﬁnancial information (earnings, cash ﬂows and book value).
Given this issue, many researchers have tried to examine the association between ﬁnancial information contained in
ﬁnancial statements and market value using various company valuation models. In this context, Lev and Zarowin (1999) have
documented, using a sample of US ﬁrms, that the usefulness of ﬁnancial information to investors has decreased signiﬁcantly
over the past two decades (1977–1996). They identify the inability to recognize the information contained in intangibles and,
more generally, the intellectual capabilities of a company, as causing this loss in the value-relevance of ﬁnancial information.
Brown, Lo, and Lys (1999) have also reported the existence of a decline in the value-relevance of earnings and book values
in explaining the market value of US companies over the period 1958–1996. According to these authors, this decline is tied,
in fact, to the large costs associated with intangible investments. These costs, which are expensed rather than capitalized,
depress both earnings and book value. In a similar study, Dantoh, Radhakrishnan, and Ronen (2004) also ﬁnd that the
explanatory power (R2) of the regression of market value on ﬁnancial information has declined over the period 1983–2000
for US companies. The study shows that the decline has been more pronounced in the highly intangible-intensive companies.
More recently, Liang and Yao (2005) conﬁrmed these results using a sample of Taiwanese high-tech companies. Indeed, their
results show that traditional ﬁnancial measures did not provide signiﬁcant explanatory power in terms of corporate value.
However, Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997) refute the commonly made assumption that increased intangibility reduces
the value-relevance of ﬁnancial information. Using a large sample of US ﬁrms, the authors show that the joint explanatory
power of earnings and book values has increased slightly over time, whereas the incremental explanatory power of earnings
has decreased over the last four decades (1953–1993). This study was supported a little later by Francis and Schipper (1999)
who, using a sample of US ﬁrms during the period 1952–1994, reported that there is no evidence of a decline in the value-
relevance of balance sheet values. Moreover, the results provide mixed support for the view that ﬁnancial statements are
less relevant for high-technology ﬁrms than for low-technology ﬁrms.
For their part, Core, Guay, and Van Buskirk (2003) found mixed support for the hypothesis according to which the
relation between market value and traditional ﬁnancial variables differs from one period (new economy) to another (pre-
vious period). Using a broad sample10 of US ﬁrms over 25 years (1975–1999), these authors document that the ability
of traditional ﬁnancial variables to explain market value decreased for the subsamples that represent the new-economy.
However, the regression model’s structure during this period is not unusual compared to other previous periods. This
8 Lev (2003) and Lev et al. (2005) used in their model three popular measures of company performance: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE),
and  growth in earnings.
9 A ﬁnancial item is generally considered as value-relevant if it has the ability to make a difference to decisions of ﬁnancial statement users. The value-
relevance is generally measured by explanatory power (R2) or response coefﬁcient (ERC). In an efﬁcient market, all value-relevant information would be
immediately and completely reﬂected in share prices.
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mplies that traditional explanatory variables of market value remain applicable to new-economy companies, but that
here is a greater variation in market values remaining to be explained by other uncorrelated omitted factors, such as
ntangibles.
Consequently, we can conclude that the results of the studies on the subject are generally mixed. Indeed, the authors dis-
gree on whether or not the ﬁnancial information has lost its value-relevance. Moreover, they even do not agree on whether
r not the economy has fundamentally changed and that a new valuation paradigm has rendered ﬁnancial (accounting)
nformation worthless.
.2. Will the inadequate accounting treatment of internally generated intangibles lead to a misallocation of resources?
The inefﬁcient valuation of intangibles, coupled with their inadequate accounting treatment, has signiﬁcant implications
or companies, shareholders, and society as a whole. Indeed, a company can suffer several socio-economic consequences
f it fails to provide appropriate and value-relevant information to shareholders as well as to potential investors. These
onsequences, such as information asymmetry, high cost of capital, riskiness, and illiquidity, can lead to a misallocation of
esources in the capital market.
Since the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970), the accounting and ﬁnance literature has recognized the existence of a
arket imperfection due to information asymmetry. In this context, the misreporting of intangibles in ﬁnancial statements,
n addition to their speciﬁcities to the company, creates a high level of information asymmetry between inside11 and outside
nvestors.
According to Easley and O’Hara (2004), the company’s inside investors generally take advantage of their private infor-
ation about companies and their intangibles to make favourable portfolio adjustments, to the detriment of the company’s
utside investors. Due to their disadvantageous position, the outsiders will generally demand a higher rate of return for
olding the company’s stock.
In this context, Aboody and Lev (2000) investigated all insider transactions by corporate ofﬁcers reported to the SEC from
985 to 1999, measuring the gains to insiders between the time of the transaction and the time that the transaction was
eported to the SEC. The authors show that in R&D intensive companies, the insiders’ gains from trading are signiﬁcantly
igher than in non-R&D intensive companies. This result obviously indicates that the access to private information can put
ompany insiders in an advantageous position in share dealing compared to outsiders.
For their part, Seow, Shangguan, and Vasudevan (2006) provided the empirical evidence of a positive relationship
etween the level of R&D investment and the cost of capital,12 using data of US companies. For these authors, the invest-
ent in R&D increases the cost of capital because these investments create an information asymmetry and tend also to be
iskier.
Indeed, it is commonly recognized that intangible investments are highly risky. This point of view partially justiﬁes the
ASB’s position for not capitalizing internally generated intangible assets. Moreover, a higher risk level implies a higher cost
f capital for the company (OECD, 2006b; Seow et al., 2006; Upton, 2001).
In this context, Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson (2002) show that the positive association between R&D invest-
ent levels and subsequent excess stock returns reﬂects the riskiness of these investments. Khotari, Laguerre, and Leone
2002) also ﬁnd strong evidence that R&D investments generate future beneﬁts that are far more uncertain than ben-
ﬁts from investments in tangible assets. The uncertainty of the future beneﬁts from intangible investments, according
o Dehning, Pfeiffer, and Richardson (2006),  increases the difﬁculty in forecasting a company’s earnings. In this setting,
hey empirically show that investment in information technology (IT) does increase earnings forecast dispersion and
rror.
The company’s cost of capital is also a function of the liquidity (or illiquidity) of its assets. Indeed, the ﬁnancial literature
as shown that investors demand a liquidity premium, which raises the company’s cost of capital (Acharya & Pedersen,
005; Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1996).
According to Seow et al. (2006),  the stocks of intangibles-intensive companies are relatively illiquid (i.e. more difﬁcult to
rade) because the investors’ estimate of their values is dispersed due to information asymmetry. In this context, Boone and
aman (2001) empirically documented the information asymmetry effects associated with off-balance sheet (unrecorded)
&D assets. Globally, the evidence suggests that the current accounting treatment of R&D spending is associated with lower
arket liquidity.13
Consequently, the results of these previous studies imply that the inadequate accounting treatment of internally gener-
ted intangibles can lead to a misallocation of resources in the capital market. This problem could, nevertheless, be attenuated
hrough greater voluntary disclosure of information about intangibles that will reduce the limitations and the distortions
esulting from the current accounting standards.
11 The inside investors, also named the insiders, deﬁned by the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act as corporate ofﬁcers, directors, and owners of 10% or
ore  of any equity class of securities. They are also deﬁned as every person who possesses private information.
12 The cost of capital is the rate of return on an investment required by investors.
13 The authors used bid-ask spreads as a proxy of stocks’ liquidity. They found that stocks of R&D intensive companies have larger bid-ask spreads.
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Table  1
Annual R&D investment growth rate (%).
Year Annual R&D investment growth rate (%)








4.3. Does the inadequate accounting treatment of internally generated intangibles preclude the growth of intangible
investments?
Some authors (e.g. Garcia-Ayuso, 2003; Lev, 2003; Lev et al., 2005) underline that the socio-economic consequences (such
as excessive cost of capital) coming from the inadequate accounting treatment of internally generated intangibles, can also
lead companies to suboptimal investment and stunted growth. However, these authors do not offer any convincing evidence
to support the claim that companies restrict their intangible investments to attenuate these socio-economic consequences.
Indeed, several macro-economic studies show that intangible investments are sizeable and growing from year to year. In
this setting, Nakamura (2001) ﬁnds that the rate of investments in intangibles for US companies has accelerated signiﬁcantly
since the electronics revolution in the 1970s. Corrado et al. (2004) and OECD (2006a, 2007) also show that investments in
intangible assets grew faster than investments in tangible assets between 1994 and 2002 in the United States as well as in
most OECD countries. More recently, Skinner (2008) conﬁrmed these studies. In fact, he provided strong empirical evidence
that intangible investments are now becoming relatively more important in the US economy, and that their accounting
treatment appear to not have adversely affected their growth.
To provide some evidence on whether the growth in intangible investments has been precluded by their inadequate
accounting treatment, we gathered data on R&D investments made by UK and international14 companies between 2001 and
2007. These data are available in the R&D Scoreboard15 published yearly by UK Department for Innovation, Universities &
Skills (DIUS). The annual growth rates for R&D investment from 2001 to 2007 are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 really indicates that annual R&D investment growth in the UK and international companies is positive from
2001 to 2007, except for 2003 and 2004 where annual R&D investment growth in the UK was slightly negative. This ﬁnding
signiﬁes, at least partially, that the inadequate accounting treatment of internally generated intangibles did not appear to
effectively inhibit their growth.
Nevertheless, some authors criticize the use of the total amount of R&D investment to measure its growth (Aboody & Lev,
2000; Cazavan-Jeny, 2004; Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; Lev, 2008). According to these authors, it is more appropriate to judge
R&D growth relative to business growth. In this sense, they consider the R&D intensity – the ratio of total R&D to total assets
– as the most appropriate measure.
Based on these considerations, we examined R&D investment growth in the UK and international companies from 2001
to 2007 using R&D intensity. We  also compared this indicator with capital expenditures intensity (Capex)  (see Figs. 1 and 2).
Contrary to the pattern seen in Table 1, Fig. 1 shows a slight decline in R&D investment realized by UK companies over
time (2001–2007). However, the capital expenditures continue to fall until 2005 when they start to go up again. As for
international companies, the decline of R&D intensity over time is more evident as can be seen from Fig. 2, while the capital
expenditures intensity continues to fall until 2004 when it starts to rise again. These results conﬁrm, in fact, the ﬁndings of
Lev (2008) which also show that US companies have not substantially increased their R&D investments – as a proportion
of sales. Nevertheless, the author concludes that it is hard to prove if this decline in R&D investment level is related to
accounting treatment of intangibles or not.
4.4. Does the inadequate accounting treatment of internally generated intangibles affect market value of the ﬁrm?Some authors (e.g. AAA, 2003; Eberhart, Maxwell, & Siddique, 2004; Garcia-Ayuso, 2003; Monahan, 2005) underline
that the current accounting treatment of expensing intangible investments implies that companies will underestimate their
earnings and book values, and consequently, investors will systematically undervalue these companies in the capital market.
14 The international companies by country within region: Europe (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Turkey, UK); Americas
(Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Cayman Islands, USA); Rest of world (Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South
Africa,  South Korea, Taiwan).
15 The Scoreboard is an international league table of the companies investing most in R&D (DIUS, 2008).















SFig. 1. R&D and capital expenditures intensities for UK companies, 2001–2007.
ource:  R&D Scoreboard.
n this setting, Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) ﬁnd, in surveying the managers of intangible-intensive companies, that 65% of
espondents believe the shares of their company are slightly to signiﬁcantly undervalued.
However, other authors (e.g. Darrough & Ye, 2007; Johnson & Pazderka, 1993; Seow et al., 2006; Skinner, 2008) refute
he assumption of such undervaluation of companies that invest in intangibles. In this setting, Johnson and Pazderka (1993)
how a positive, statistically signiﬁcant relationship between R&D spending and market value, using a sample of Canadian
ompanies. Sougiannis (1994) also ﬁnds, using a sample of US companies, that a one-dollar increase in R&D spending
roduces, on average, a ﬁve-dollar increase in market value. More recently, Skinner (2008) showed that several intangibles-
ntensive companies (e.g. Microsoft, Google, Dell, Cisco, Intel) are relatively highly valued by investors in the capital market.
lthough these results are partly explained by the fact that these companies have a high level of risk, they also indicate
hat investors perceive intangibles as “assets” (sources of value creation) despite not being recognized by the accounting
tandards (Cazavan-Jeny, 2004; Goodwin & Ahmed, 2006).
Using a portfolio approach on a sample of US companies spanning 32 years (1972–2003), Lev et al. (2005) found that the
urrent accounting treatment of expensing R&D expenditures leads sometimes to undervaluation, sometimes to overvalua-
ion of companies according to the period. In this sense, stocks of conservatively reporting companies (notably in emerging
ndustries, such as biotechnology, and young companies) are systematically undervalued. Inversely, stocks of aggressively
Fig. 2. R&D and capital expenditures intensities for international companies, 2001–2007.
ource:  R&D Scoreboard.
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reporting companies (notably mature companies) are overvalued since they report earnings that appear to be much better
than they really are. These misvaluations tend to be corrected when the information distortions switch from conservative
to aggressive, and vice versa.
Consequently, we can conclude that authors generally agree that the inadequate accounting treatment of internally
generated intangibles leads to systematic misvaluation of companies. However, there is no consensus as to whether these
companies are undervalued or overvalued by investors in the capital market. That seems to be due to the fact that the
relationship between the current accounting treatment of expensing intangibles and market value depends heavily on the
moderating effect of size, age and economic sector of the company.
5. The role of voluntary disclosure
5.1. The initiatives
Given the inadequate accounting treatment of internally generated intangibles, and the negative consequences that may
result from it, considerable efforts have been made, over the last years, by the world’s most inﬂuential standard setting
bodies to enhance the quality of the information provided to investors for efﬁcient decision making (AICPA, 1994; CICA,
1995; ICAEW, 2000; FASB, 2001b).
In this setting, two types of models and guidelines have been formulated to supplement companies’ ﬁnancial statements.
These may  be either disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information, or speciﬁc disclosure on intangible assets (ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial information), and are sometimes presented in the form of stand-alone reports (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004;
OECD, 2006a,b).
5.1.1. Models and guidelines for non-ﬁnancial disclosure
Many observers emphasize that the traditional Financial Model is incomplete and therefore it is no longer able to describe
the economic realities of business. In 1991, in an attempt to answer questions regarding the reengineering of the ﬁnancial
reporting process, the American Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants (AICPA) formed the Jenkins Committee. In the fall
of 1994, the committee completed its work: “Improving Business Reporting – A Customer Focus; Meeting the Information
Needs of Investors and Creditors.”
The Jenkins Committee, which worked with the users of ﬁnancial statements in preparing its report, discovered that users
want more of both non-ﬁnancial information and also forward-looking information, thus broadening the present focus on
past ﬁnancial information. To meet the needs of users, the Jenkins Committee suggests that the traditional Financial Model be
replaced by the Business Model. This model is based on ﬁnancial information but also uses other information describing the
wealth creation process within the enterprise. Such information should cover information on operating and value creation
indicators, and also on other indicators of the future strategies and plans of the company. The information in this model
therefore contains quantitative information, ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial as well as narrative.
For its part, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) has been working on a new-economy project since 1994.
The project report entitled « Performance measures in the new economy » suggested providing non-ﬁnancial performance
measures. These measures are very important both in strategic planning and shareholder value. In 2000, the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) published a similar study authored by Charles Leadbeater entitled « New
measures for the new economy » This study proposed, among other approaches, an incrementalist approach for intangibles.
In such an approach, traditional ﬁnancial accounting would remain the focus of corporate reporting but would be supported
by non-ﬁnancial information that would help investors to value intangibles.
Moreover, at the request of the AICPA16, the Steering Committee of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in
2001 issued a report entitled « Improving Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosure »17 The aim of this
report was to present a framework which would encourage voluntary and coherent disclosure of the company’s key success
factors, including intangibles.
More recently, the US Securities and Exchange Commission18 (SEC) and the Canadian Securities Administrators19 (CSA)
mandated listed companies to produce a ‘Management and Discussion Analysis’ (MD&A) in the front sections of their annual
reports. The aim of the MD&A is, in fact, to require companies to report “through the eyes” of their management and to
offer more narrative and analytical non-ﬁnancial information about their ﬁnancial statements. These initiatives were then
adopted by the European Commission in its 4th and 7th Company Law Directives. Indeed, since 2005, EU companies (except
for small companies) had to expand their directors’ reports to include a ‘Business Review.’20
16 The AICPA asked: “Should the FASB broaden its activities beyond ﬁnancial statements and related disclosures to also address the types of non-ﬁnancial
information that would be included in a comprehensive business reporting model?”
17 http://www.fasb.org/brrp/brrp2.shtml (accessed the 22nd November 2009).
18 http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8350.htm (accessed the 22nd November 2009).
19 http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/rule 20031219 51-102 con-dis.pdf (accessed the 22nd November 2009).
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.1.2. Models and guidelines for speciﬁc disclosure about intangible assets
In an unprecedented initiative, the Danish Agency for Trade and Industry (DATI) developed in 1998 a model for disclosure
f speciﬁc information on intangibles called the “Intellectual Capital Statement.” This model combines ﬁgures, narratives
nd even graphics. It may  also have two objectives: one is internal, to complete ﬁnancial information management, and
he other is external, to complete annual accounts. Indeed, the aim of the “Intellectual Capital Statement” is to allow the
ompany to present its efforts to develop its knowledge resources.
For its part, the European Commission developed in 2002 the MERITUM project, « Guidelines for Managing and Reporting
n Intangibles » This project aimed to improve intangible assets management and to encourage voluntary disclosure of these
ssets to different users.
More recently, the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour developed in 2004 its model of “Intellectual Capital
tatement.” This initiative was followed by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) which provided in
005 guidelines for disclosure of intangible assets based management.
.2. Review of empirical literature
Based on previously cited models and guidelines, several empirical studies have been conducted. These studies have
ainly examined the relationship between non-ﬁnancial disclosure (or speciﬁc disclosure on intangible assets) and (1) the
alue-relevance of ﬁnancial information; (2) resource allocation; (3) growth of intangible investments; and (4) market value
f the ﬁrm.
.2.1. Value-relevance of ﬁnancial information and voluntary disclosure
Many empirical studies show that managers generally use voluntary disclosure practices to compensate for the loss of rel-
vance of ﬁnancial information. In this context, Lang and Lundholm (1993) documented that ﬁrms with less value-relevant
nancial information have higher disclosure scores, using the Association for Investment Management and Research21
AIMR) scores as the proxy for voluntary disclosure. Tasker (1998) also shows that managers provide more voluntary disclo-
ure through conference calls when ﬁnancial information is relatively less relevant. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) ﬁnd that
rms with less informative ﬁnancial information are more likely to disclose via press releases than other ﬁrms. More recently,
ones (2007) conﬁrmed these results using a sample of intangibles-intensive companies. Indeed, he found that managers
end to voluntarily disclose more information about their intangible investments in annual reports and conference calls
ecause the ﬁnancial information is less value-relevant in explaining market value.
Given the managers’ orientation towards voluntary disclosure of non-ﬁnancial information, some researchers have
ttempted to include this information in their equity valuation models to reﬁne accounting based valuation techniques.
n this context, Amir and Lev (1996) examined the value-relevance to investors of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial information of
S cellular companies (High-tech sector). Their results show that ﬁnancial information (earnings, cash ﬂows, book values)
s not relevant anymore for the evaluation of these companies, whereas the non-ﬁnancial indicators (such as the total pop-
lation in a service area and the market penetration) are highly value-relevant. Indeed, when the non-ﬁnancial measures
re combined with ﬁnancial measures in the equity valuation model, the latter become value-relevant.
In a similar study, Liang and Yao (2005) showed, using a sample of Taiwanese electronics industry ﬁrms, that non-ﬁnancial
nformation disclosed about intangibles has incremental explanatory power far beyond ﬁnancial information in explaining
 company’s value. This result implies that non-ﬁnancial information supplements ﬁnancial information in evaluating this
ind of companies. More recently, Yu et al. (2009) using a sample of Taiwanese IT ﬁrms reported that the inclusion of
isclosed information about intangibles alongside ﬁnancial information in equity valuation models signiﬁcantly increases
he models’ explanatory power (R2). This increase in explanatory power suggests that non-ﬁnancial information disclosed
bout intangibles is relevant for purposes of the valuation of new-economy companies. Moreover, this result emphasizes the
mportance of incorporating intangibles, if available, as “other information” when one uses the valuation models to address
alue relevance and business valuation issues.
Consequently, we can conclude that voluntary disclosure on intangibles is viewed by managers as a solution to com-
ensate for the loss of the relevance of ﬁnancial information, and the incorporation of this different information into
quity valuation models mitigates the omitted variables problem present in most current equity valuation models used
y researchers.
.2.2. Voluntary disclosure and resource allocation
Many studies also show that managers tend to voluntarily disclose more information about their intangible investmentso attenuate different negative socio-economic consequences. In this setting, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) survey
anagers from 312 public US companies and ﬁnd that 44.3% of managers agree or strongly agree that voluntarily com-
unicating information increases the overall liquidity of their stock (against 17.4% of managers who disagree or strongly
21 The AIMR is an association of ﬁnancial analysts who provide, among other activities, rankings of US companies based on their disclosure activities. In
004,  the association changed its name to CFA Institute after it ceased to provide such disclosure ratings in 1997.
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disagree). This statement has been empirically validated by a number of researchers. For example, Welker (1995) investi-
gated the liquidity impact of companies’ voluntary disclosure using AIMR disclosure rankings. He ﬁnds that companies in
the bottom third of the disclosure rankings have about 50% higher bid-ask spreads than companies in the top third of the
rankings. Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) also used AIMR rankings to analyze a sample of companies that exhibit a vol-
untary and sustained increase in their disclosure. They ﬁnd that expanded disclosure improves the liquidity of their stocks,
reduces the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, and can help correct any company’s misvaluation.
Graham et al. (2005) also ﬁnd that 39.3% of interviewed managers agree or strongly agree that voluntarily communicating
information reduces their cost of capital (against 22% of managers who disagree or strongly disagree). This statement has
been empirically validated by several researchers. For example, using a self-constructed disclosure index, Botosan (1997)
documented that greater disclosure in the annual reports of US companies that are not highly followed by analysts is
associated with a lower cost of capital. Focusing on voluntary disclosure of intangibles information in the annual reports
of EU companies, Kristandl and Bontis (2007) have recently provided strong empirical evidence of a negative relationship
between the level of forward-oriented disclosure on intangibles and cost of capital. These results were then conﬁrmed by
Orens, Aerts, and Lybaert (2009) who demonstrate that a greater disclosure of intangibles by EU companies on their corporate
websites is associated with lower information asymmetry, lower cost of equity capital, and lower cost of debt capital.
Consequently, we can conclude that additional public disclosure on intangibles can mitigate the adverse selection problem
in the capital market by reducing the information asymmetry between the company and investors, allowing for greater
liquidity and lowering the company’s cost of ﬁnance. This may  contribute to an improvement of market efﬁciency, and, at
the company level, may  allow for a more efﬁcient allocation of resources in the capital market.
5.2.3. Growth of intangible investments and voluntary disclosure
Some empirical studies show that an increased level of intangible investments that create value in the future can result
in a higher level of disclosure on these investments. Entwistle (1999) emphasized the importance of R&D intensity as a key
factor in explaining the level of R&D disclosure by Canadian companies. In other words, the evidence shows that the greater
the R&D intensity, the more information is disclosed by a company about its R&D. Gelb (2002) also ﬁnds that companies
with higher levels of intangible investments are more likely to emphasize alternative voluntary disclosures over traditional
accounting reports.
In a similar study, Vergauwen, Bollen, and Oirbans (2007) provided empirical evidence of a positive association between
the relative importance of intangible assets and intangibles disclosure in annual reports of EU companies. Their evidence
shows that companies tend to disclose more information on intangibles when a higher level of intangibles is present in
an organization. More recently, Zéghal, Mouelhi, and Louati (2007) conﬁrmed these results using a sample of Canadian
companies. Indeed, their ﬁndings show that there is a signiﬁcantly positive association between the extent of voluntary
disclosure on R&D activities and R&D intensity.
Given that a large portion of intangible investments are generally undertaken by companies in the high-technology
sectors, Abdolmohammadi (2005) and Sonnier (2008) ﬁnd that these companies have a higher frequency of disclosure of
information about intangibles than do the traditional sectors in the US.
Consequently, we can conclude that voluntary disclosure is considered as an efﬁcient process to communicate to investors
some information on intangibles not recognized in the ﬁnancial statements. This information could be communicated via
annual reports, web sites, press release, conference calls, etc.
5.2.4. Voluntary disclosure and market value of the ﬁrm
Several empirical studies show that market value is inﬂuenced by the extent and type of information on intangible
assets that is publicly disclosed. In this setting, Lev (2002) found that the average stock price reaction to U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approvals in the pharmaceutical industry was 0.51% in the absence of further information. The
average reaction rose 1.13% when the approval announcement was accompanied by non-ﬁnancial qualitative information,
and quadrupled to 2.01% when non-ﬁnancial quantitative information was  also provided.
In a survey administered to a group of ﬁnancial professionals in Hong Kong, Petty, Ricceri, and Guthrie (2008) notice
that 88% of respondents believe that greater disclosure on intangibles would be rewarded with an increase in the company’s
stock price. This statement has been empirically validated. For example, Abdolmohammadi (2005) provides strong empirical
evidence of a positive relationship between disclosure of intangibles information in annual reports of US companies and
their market capitalization. Gerpott, Thomas, and Hoffmann (2008),  using an international sample of stock-quoted telecom-
munications network operators (TNOs), also show that the overall quality of disclosure on intangibles in annual reports and
websites has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on market capitalization, More recently, Orens et al. (2009) conﬁrmed these
results on a sample of EU companies. Indeed, they found that ﬁrm value is positively associated with the level of intangibles
disclosure on its corporate website.
Using AIMR scores as proxy for voluntary disclosure, Healy et al. (1999) also ﬁnd that stocks of companies with large and
sustained improvements in their relative rankings systematically outperform their peers in the same industry during the
year of the disclosure increase and the following year. This result was  recently conﬁrmed by Lajili and Zéghal (2006) using
a portfolio performance approach. Indeed, they report that companies with higher intangible (human) assets disclosure
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Consequently, we can conclude that publicly disclosed information about intangibles can supplement the ﬁnancial
nformation, and that capital markets reward companies for increased disclosure.
. Conclusion
In the new economy, intangible assets have become the main value creators for a large number of companies and economic
ectors. However, the valuation of these assets within the accounting framework raises several problems with regard to their
dentiﬁcation, measurement, and control.
Under current accounting standards, most of the intangible investments are to be expensed when incurred. The relative
ack of accounting recognition of intangibles investments as assets led several researchers to wonder about the consequences
f this inadequate accounting treatment on (1) the value-relevance of ﬁnancial information, (2) the resource allocation in
he capital market, (3) the growth in intangible investments, and (4) the market value of the ﬁrm.
The ultimate conclusion about research on the value-relevance of ﬁnancial information is that the results are generally
ixed. Indeed, the authors disagree on whether or not ﬁnancial information has lost its relevance. Moreover, they do not
ven agree on whether or not the economy has fundamentally changed and whether a new valuation paradigm has rendered
nancial (accounting) information worthless. The disagreement between authors seems due to the omission of an important
ontrol factor, namely information disclosed about intangibles, in their equity valuation models. In fact, recent studies show
hat voluntary disclosure of intangibles information is viewed by managers as a solution to compensate for the loss of
elevance of ﬁnancial information. The incorporation of this different information into equity valuation models mitigates
he omitted variables problem present in most current equity valuation models used by researchers.
However, researchers studying the socio-economic consequences have generally agreed that inadequate accounting
reatment of internally generated intangibles can lead to a misallocation of resources in the capital market. This problem
ould, nevertheless, be attenuated through greater disclosure of information about intangibles to investors. Indeed, recent
tudies on the subject show that additional disclosure about intangibles to the public could contribute to improved market
fﬁciency, and at a company level, decrease the cost of ﬁnance and allow for a more efﬁcient allocation of resources in the
apital market.
As for the research on the growth in intangible investments, we  validated, using data on R&D investments made by
K and international companies between 2001 and 2007, some studies showing that the inadequate accounting treatment
f intangible investments did not effectively inhibit their growth. Although this ﬁnding is only true to a certain extent, it
ould indicate that companies generally ﬁnd other means of communicating information about their intangibles, such as the
isclosure of information about intangibles in annual reports, websites, conference calls, press releases, etc. In fact, recent
tudies show that an increased level of intangible investments can result in a higher level of disclosure on intangibles.
When it comes to research on market value, authors are generally agreed that the inadequate accounting treatment
f internally generated intangibles leads to systematic misvaluation of companies. However, there is no consensus as to
hether these companies are undervalued or overvalued by investors in the capital market. These systematic misvaluations
ould, nevertheless, be attenuated through greater disclosure of information about intangibles to investors. Indeed, the
ecent studies on the subject show that intangibles disclosure can supplement the ﬁnancial information, and that capital
arkets reward companies for increased disclosure.
The conclusions of this article have several practical implications. First, managers should provide more information about
heir intangible investments in order to attenuate different negative consequences resulting from their inadequate account-
ng treatment. Second, accounting standard setters should pursue more sophisticated accounting standards for intangibles.
hey should also provide more detailed guidance to constituents about useful information disclosures on intangibles which
ould be a particular beneﬁt to intangible-intensive companies. Third, investors should be seeking greater transparency
nd more disclosure of information about intangibles.
Finally, there are a number of potential areas for future research. First, the above conclusions should be explored by
ualitative research including interviews with managers and investors to test their validity. Indeed, future research could
ocus on the way in which managers and investors recognize the importance of disclosing information on intangibles. Second,
uture research should consider the disclosure of information about intangibles from a cost-beneﬁt perspective. Finally, we
onclude with the famous expression: “Much remains to be done,” and researchers have indeed much to do to meet the
hallenges of accounting for intangibles.
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